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The most salient feature of the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system
is the possibility of authorizing a trade sanction against a scofflaw member government. Yet this
feature is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it fortifies WTO rules and promotes respect for them.
On the other hand, it undermines the principle of free trade and provokes “sanction-envy” in
other international organizations. Undoubtedly, the implanting of “teeth” by the WTO
negotiators was one of the key achievements of the Uruguay Round, and a very significant step
in the evolution of international economic law. But after six years of experience, WTO observers
are beginning to consider whether recourse to damaging trade measures was a good idea.1 This
article provides an analytical framework for rethinking WTO trade sanctions.
To be sure, the WTO Agreement does not employ the word “sanction.” What the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) of 1994 says in Article 22 is that if a government fails to bring a
measure found to be inconsistent with a WTO rule into compliance, it shall enter into negotiations
with the government invoking dispute settlement, and if no mutually acceptable compensation is
agreed, the plaintiff government may seek authorization from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) “to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations
under the covered agreements.”2 This language is based on a similar provision in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947. It provided that the Contracting Parties may
give a ruling in a complaint regarding the failure of a party to carry out its obligations. If the
Contracting Parties “consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action,
they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other
contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations as they determine to be
appropriate in the circumstances.”3
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Yet even without using the S-word, the WTO utilizes a sanction. As will be shown in this
article, the purpose of the WTO action is to induce compliance, and that is properly called a
“sanction.” With the advent of the WTO, the trade policy community has recognized that the
WTO system is different than the GATT system, and has increasingly employed the term
“sanction” to describe what DSU Article 22 authorizes. The old GATT idea of suspending
concessions has metamorphosed in the WTO into a trade sanction.
Authorizations for WTO sanctions do not occur often. Out of the 37 disputes in which a
defendant government was judged in violation, only two have led to trade sanctions.4 The two
cases involved the European Communities (EC) as the defendant -- the Bananas and meat
Hormones disputes. In December 2000, the DSB authorized Canada to impose trade sanctions
against Brazil in the Aircraft dispute, but Canada has not yet done so.5
The refusal of the EC to comply after being sanctioned has led to two critical perspectives
on the DSU. One camp says that the sanctions failed because the teeth are not sharp enough. In
the United States, proponents of this view in the U.S. Congress succeeded in enacting a
“carousel” provision to rotate the targets for trade sanctions. The other camp says that the
Bananas and Hormones episodes demonstrate the disutility of trade sanctions. An exemplification
of this view in the United States was the Meltzer Commission which stated in March 2000 that
“instead of retaliation, countries guilty of illegal trade practices should pay an annual fine equal to
the value of the damages assessed by the panel, or provide equivalent trade liberalization.”6
A less critical, and probably majority, perspective is that it is too soon to judge the merits of
WTO sanctions. The Bananas and Hormones episodes are far from over.7 Moreover, in some
cases, such as Australia Salmon, the threat of WTO-authorized sanctions was probably
instrumental in securing compliance by the defendant government.8
While it may be too soon to issue a conclusive judgment, it is not too soon to begin an
assessment of the experience of WTO sanctions. Such an assessment should consider the impact
of sanctions for achieving compliance with WTO rules. Yet it should also go beyond that to
consider how such “hard” enforcement affects public opinion about the WTO and trade itself.
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Without trade sanctions, surely no one would call the WTO the “World Takeover Organization,”
as some protestors did at the Seattle Ministerial Conference. A comprehensive assessment should
also consider the impact of WTO sanctions on other international treaty systems that may want to
emulate the WTO in employing trade sanctions.
This article attempts a preliminary assessment along these lines. It proceeds in four parts.
Part I discusses the role of trade sanctions in the trade regime, emphasizing the difference between
compensation that restores a previously balanced exchange and purposive trade measures to
induce compliance. Part II lays out the advantages and disadvantages of the current use of trade
sanctions in WTO dispute settlement. Part III explores alternatives to trade sanctions, including
“softer” measures that may one day replace trade sanctions. Part IV makes recommendations and
concludes.

I. Role of Trade Sanctions in the Trade Regime
This Part provides a brief history of the sanctioning idea and discusses the provisions in the
GATT and the WTO. My thesis is that the GATT concept of rebalancing concessions was
transmogrified by the WTO into a trade sanction. It is true, of course, that the drafters of GATT in
1947 recognized the sanction-like quality of GATT-authorized trade retorsion. But the sanction
paradigm was resisted during the GATT years. Only after the WTO began to operate did it
become routine to refer to WTO-authorized trade measures as a “sanction.”

Background
The idea of retaliation is an old one. The most famous command was given by the God of
the Old Testament: “If anyone injures his neighbor, whatever he has done must be done to him:
fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth.”9 This sentiment has continuing appeal to
human emotion, but is not a general principle of law.
Trade retaliation goes back many centuries, and became part of U.S. law in the
Antidumping Act of 1916. This provision, still in force, provides that “Whenever any country …
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shall prohibit the importation of any article [which is] the product of the soil or industry of the
United States and not injurious to health or morals, the President shall have the power to prohibit
… the importation into the United States of similar articles” or other articles from that country.10
This provision has seen little use.
The first treaty compliance process to provide for a trade sanction was in the International
Labour Organization (ILO), as set out in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. These rules served as a
model for subsequent international dispute mechanisms, such as the GATT. The ILO rules
provided that a government (or non-government delegate!) could initiate a complaint that another
government was not observing an ILO convention that both had ratified.11 The ILO Governing
Body would then have the option of calling for a Commission of Inquiry to be drawn from rosters
nominated by governments.12 The Commission was to investigate the matter and make findings
of fact, and then recommend steps that should be taken to address the complaint, and the time
within which they should be taken.13 The Commission could also indicate “measures of an
economic character against a defaulting Government which it considers to be appropriate … .”14
Either government could then appeal the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice
which was to make the final decision on merits and on any “measures of an economic character”
that other governments would be justified in taking.15 No government was required to undertake
such economic measures, but any government could do so if the defaulting government did not
carry out the recommendations with the time specified.16 Should the defaulting government later
contend that it had come into compliance, it could request a Commission of Inquiry to verify its
contention and, if verified, the “measures of an economic character” were to be discontinued.17
The ILO’s elegant procedure was never fully utilized.18 No economic measures were ever
recommended. It was not until 81 years later that the ILO Conference, pursuant to an amended
Constitutional provision, authorized measures against a government for refusing to adhere to a
ratified ILO Convention.19 This occurred in 2000 with the series of measures against Myanmar
(Burma) for continued failure to comply with the ILO Forced Labor Convention (No. 29).20
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No general multilateral trade treaty included dispute settlement backed by trade
enforcement until the advent of the GATT.21 But in the first half of the 20th century, some
multilateral commodity treaties did so. For example, the Sugar Agreement of 1937 provided that
the Sugar Council could hear complaints about a party’s failure to comply, and recommend
measures to other parties “in view of the infringement.”22 If the Council decided that other
parties should prohibit the importation of sugar from the infringing country, the Agreement
provided that this “shall not be deemed to be contrary to any most-favoured-nation rights which
the offending Government may enjoy.”23
In the decades since the founding of the GATT, dozens of regional trade agreements have
established dispute mechanisms. 24 Many of these agreements provide for trade remedies
analogous to GATT Article XXIII.25 Only a small part of this experience is addressed here.
Although the League of Nations could authorize economic sanctions against countries that
resorted to war, and although the United Nations Security Council can call for economic
sanctions against a country guilty of a breach of peace, such sanctions were imposed only three
times between 1920 and 1990.26 Since then, however, economic sanctions have been used
frequently.27 It is possible for the Security Council to use sanctions to enforce a decision of the
International Court of Justice, but the Security Council typically takes action independently of
judicial decisions.28 The authors of GATT recognized the potential conflict between U.N.-directed
trade sanctions and GATT rules, and therefore provided a GATT exception for trade measures
taken in pursuance of obligations under the U.N. Charter for the maintenance of peace and
security. 29 Thus, the recent U.N. trade sanctions imposed on Sierra Leone30 regarding “conflict
diamonds” do not violate the WTO.

The GATT System
Because the drafters of the Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO) included
an entire chapter on the “Settlement of Differences,” the dispute settlement provisions in the
GATT are bare bones.31 The remedies in the GATT and the (defunct) ITO Charter were similar
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however. In the GATT, the Contracting Parties may authorize a complaining country to suspend
the application of such concessions or other obligations as the Contracting Parties determine to
be appropriate.32 In the ITO Charter, the Conference had the authority to release an injured
country from obligations (or previously granted concessions) to any other country “to the extent
and upon such conditions as it considers appropriate and compensatory, having regard to the
benefit which has been nullified or impaired.”33 One difference in the treaties is that the ITO
provision specifies an action that is “appropriate and compensatory,” while the GATT uses the
term “appropriate,” but not the term “compensatory.” Neither the GATT nor the ITO Charter
employed the terms “retaliation” or “sanction.”
In his study of the GATT and ITO preparatory work, John Jackson concludes that “it was
clear that the draftsmen had in mind that [GATT] Article XXIII would play an important role in
obtaining compliance with the GATT obligations.”34 He also notes that there were differing
views on how far Article XXIII should gothat is, whether the suspension provision should be
limited to the equivalence of the damage done, or should authorize action in the nature of a
sanction. Some countries, such as the Arab League, opposed recourse to sanctions.35
In his study of the ITO preparatory work, Robert Hudec explains that the issue of
compensation versus sanctions proved to be controversial, and so was sent to a working party.
The working party agreed that even in the case of a legal violation, the remedy should be
compensatory and no more.36 Yet as Hudec points out, the working party’s language was not
included in the ITO or its Annex. In Hudec’s view, the drafters did not want to say that the
offending country owed no more than compensation because that would have suggested that the
ITO obligations were merely a duty to pay for damage done, rather than a duty to adhere to the
rules.
Clair Wilcox, a leading U.S. drafter, wrote a book about the ITO Charter in 1949, and his
discussion of dispute resolution illuminates the dualistic role of these provisions. Wilcox explains
that releasing the complaining government from its obligations is regarded “as a method of
restoring a balance of benefits and obligations … . It is nowhere described as a penalty to be
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imposed on members who may violate their obligations or as a sanction to insure that these
obligations will be observed.”37 But Wilcox does not stop there. He goes on to predict: “But
even though it is not so regarded, it will operate in fact as a sanction and a penalty.”38
The historical record is unclear as to when the term “retaliation” began to be widely used
to describe a GATT Article XXIII action.39 The repeated use of that term in Kenneth Dam’s book
(on the GATT) in 1970 may have popularized “retaliation” as a GATT principle.40 Dam explained
that the act of retaliation constitutes “the heart of the GATT enforcement system.”41 The term
“retaliation” connotes more belligerence than a rebalancing of negotiated concessions.
The term “sanction” was occasionally used by GATT experts. For example, a Secretariat
Note in 1965 characterized withdrawing concessions under Article XXIII as “the final
sanction.”42 In 1969, John Jackson described Article XXIII as a “sanctioning procedure.”43 In
1975, Eric Wyndham-White wrote that “The contractual nature of GATT determines the nature of
its provisions for enforcement and sanctions.”44 In 1984, Guy de Lacharrière wrote that the GATT
had once permitted The Netherlands to impose a “sanction” on the United States.45
But generally “GATTologists” avoided using that term.46 The author can remember being
taught in the early 1980s that GATT Article XXIII was to be distinguished from a trade sanction.
The standard portrayal of this Article was a rebalancing of concessions.
One reason why the rebalancing paradigm lasted so long was that no GATT-authorized
trade action ever occurred. The Contracting Parties authorized an Article XXIII suspension only
once back in 1952, and The Netherlands did not impose the authorized quota.47 So Wilcox’s
prediction never had the opportunity to ripen.48

The WTO System
The GATT dispute settlement system was completely renovated in the WTO. Defendant
governments lost their power to block the formation of dispute panels and to block the adoption
of panel reports. The establishment of the Appellate Body made the system more judicial and
authoritative. At Marrakesh, the trade ministers commended themselves for “the stronger and
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clearer legal framework they have adopted for the conduct of world trade, including a more
effective and reliable dispute settlement mechanism.”49
The political flexibility inherent in the GATT was eliminated in the WTO.50 The GATT said
that the Contracting Parties “may” authorize suspension of concessions if the circumstances are
“serious” enough and as they determine to be “appropriate.”51 By contrast, the DSU states that
after certain procedures have elapsed, the DSB “shall grant authorization to suspend concessions
or other obligations.”52 In addition to being mandatory, the new procedures remove judicial
discretion to resist a suspension in inappropriate or non-serious situations. The level of such a
suspension is to be equivalent to the level of the nullification and impairment.53
Other provisions in the DSU changed the context of GATT-authorized trade measures.
DSU Article 22.8 states that suspension actions “shall be temporary and shall only be applied
until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been
removed … .” 54 DSU Article 23.2(c) states that suspension actions are “in response to the failure
of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable
period of time.” The tenor of these provisions is that a suspension operates as an instrument of
enforcement. The GATT provided for the same retaliatory instrument, but the subtext was
different. With the GATT, one could view the suspension of “concessions or other obligations”
as an internal decision to re-equilibrate tariffs or quotas in the absence of a satisfactory adjustment
achieved bilaterally. But with the WTO, a suspension now has an externally-directed purpose of
inducing compliance.
Some arbitrators expounding DSU Article 22 have held that its rationale is to induce
compliance. In U.S.-EC Bananas, the DSU Article 22.6 arbitrators stated that “We agree with the
United States that this temporary nature [of countermeasures] indicates that it is the purpose of
countermeasures to induce compliance.” 55 In Ecuador-EC Bananas, the arbitrators stated that
the “desired result” of suspension is “to induce compliance” and to do so, the complaining
governments may seek suspension that is “strong.”56
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When a trade measure (on unrelated products) is used against a country to induce its
compliance with international obligations, that is properly called a “sanction.” The more
technical term for this is a “countermeasure.”57 Note that the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) actually uses the term “countermeasures” to describe the action
that can be authorized by the DSB when a government fails to comply with a panel report.58
In the Brazil Aircraft subsidy dispute, the arbitrators declared that an appropriate
countermeasure “effectively induces compliance.”59 Furthermore, the arbitrators determined that
SCM countermeasures need not be based on the level of “nullification or impairment.”60 In other
words, the arbitrators rejected rebalancing as the basis for setting the level of the countermeasure.
Instead, they permitted retaliation equal to the size of the subsidy.61
The nature of WTO obligationsfar broader than GATT’sis another reason why it is
very difficult to maintain that DSU Article 22 measures are merely a rebalancing of concessions
when the bargained-for terms of the contract are not fulfilled. This point can be made for both
Bananas and Hormones, but is clearer in Hormones. In that dispute, the EC was regulating the use
of hormones without basing its action on a risk assessment. This regulation violated the WTO
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), and the panel was
able to quantify the level of “nullification or impairment” to serve as the basis for the U.S.
retaliation. But the exact nature of SPS obligations is far from evident by looking at the text.
These obligations have been spelled out through a series of important decisions by the Appellate
Body.62 Because the law itself is so ambiguous, it is hard to view interpreting and enforcing that
law merely as maintaining a delicate balance of concessions or restoring the expected value of the
Uruguay Round contract.
Another problem with the old rebalancing idea is that in the two retaliations so far, the U.S.
government did not technically suspend concessions. The U.S. retaliation imposed 100 percent
tariffs (intended to be prohibitive) on an array of goods. Yet none of the tariffs on these goods in
1947 even approached 100 percent, and so the U.S. countermeasures were not technically a
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suspension of a GATT concession. 63 So the U.S. action looks much more like a sanction than a
withdrawal of trade concessions to EC countries.
The Article 22.6 arbitrators have not considered whether the 100 percent tariffs could
qualify as a suspension of a concession.64 Of course, DSU Article 22.6 also permits the suspension
of “other obligations,” and so arbitrators could justify the U.S. countermeasures as a suspension
of GATT Articles I and II. But suspending fundamental GATT rules misfits the rebalancing
paradigm.
In contemporary discourse about WTO dispute settlement, analysts commonly refer to DSU
Article 22 measures as a “sanction.” Consider several examples from points along the trade
policy spectrum:
The much more stringent dispute settlement procedure of the WTO ensures compliance -that is, withdrawal of the measure -- in the case of a positive finding, or sanctions for
noncompliance …. Sylvia Ostry, The Post-Cold War Trading System, 1997.65
[The DSU] gave complaining parties an automatic right to impose retaliatory trade sanctions
in cases where the defendant government failed to comply with legal rulings. Robert Hudec,
1999. 66
The ILO’s rules operate like the rules of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) ….
This is in sharp contrast to the WTO, where the failure of one country to follow the
mutually-agreed-upon rules can be challenged by another WTO Member country in WTO
dispute panels, which are empowered to authorize trade sanctions for violations. Lori
Wallach & Michelle Sforza, Whose Trade Organization?, 1999. 67
China’s commitments will be enforceable through WTO dispute settlement. For the First
Time. In no previous trade agreement has China agreed to subject its decisions to impartial
review, and ultimately imposition of sanctions if necessary -- and China will not be able to
block panel decisions. White House Fact Sheet, 2000.68
The ultimate cost of disregarding WTO pronouncements is retaliatory sanctions that, if
pressed far enough, can amount to economic ostracization. Paul Stephan, 2000.69
If Thailand, say, fails to stamp out counterfeit Louis Vuitton handbags and pirated viagra,
France and the United States can seek WTO approval to retaliate by imposing trade
sanctions. The Economist, 2000.70
If the defendant member refuses to either change its out-of-conformity law or offer
acceptable compensation, then under WTO rules the plaintiff member can impose trade
sanctions against the offending member. Cato Institute, 2000. 71
The WTO is unique in combining a set of binding rules with a powerful mechanism for
dispute settlement and the possibility of imposing economic sanctions to enforce compliance.
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2000. 72
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We have a dispute settlement system which provides for sanctions in the case of
noncompliance. Of course, if the U.S. complies at the end of the day [on FSC] there will
be no sanctions, but if they don’t comply there will be sanctions. It’s as simple as that.
Pascal Lamy, 2000. 73

Perhaps all these officials and commentators get it wrong. But I submit that this ordinary usage
reflects the reality of the law in DSU Article 22.
Recently in the Bananas Retaliation case, the WTO panel actually used the term
“sanction,” calling it “the ultimate remedy under WTO law.”74 The term sanction is also used on
the WTO website which explains that the DSB may give permission for “limited trade sanctions
….” 75 After the DSB gave Canada permission to retaliate against Brazil, the WTO website
announced that the DSB “had agreed to let Canada impose trade sanctions ….”76
Many governments and commentators view the possibility of sanctions as a positive
feature of the WTO in making its rules “enforceable.”77 With a robust dispute settlement system
and potential recourse to sanctions, the WTO is portrayed as an exceptional international
organization that comes closer than most to propounding real law. Whatever the truth to that
observation, it seems likely that Uruguay Round negotiators were able to obtain deeper
governmental commitments than they would have without the many improvements in the GATT
dispute system, such as the automatic approval of DSU Article 22 retaliation.
Let me recap the discussion so far: My thesis is that although the instrument of suspending
“concessions or other obligations” remains constant from the GATT to the WTO, the dualistic
quality of this act has shifted. In the GATT, Article XXIII trade measures were conceived primarily
as rebalancing (although analysts recognized the sanction potential). In the WTO, the trade
measure is conceived primarily as a sanction, while the rebalancing idea retains vestigial influence.
As economists have long observed, a single instrument cannot serve two distinct purposes.
Thus, one would not expect WTO-sponsored trade measures to serve equally well the purposes of
rebalancing and inducing compliance. Because the DSU prescribes retaliation at a dose equal to
“nullification or impairment,” that will limit its effectiveness at inducing compliance.78 So the
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trading system has embraced the idea of a compliance sanction even though it lacks authority to
authorize actions tough enough to compel.
The mismatch between instrument and purpose gets even more complex in considering two
other possible goals for DSU Article 22 trade measures.79 One is “compensation” in the contractlaw-sense of recompensing damages in order to make the injured party whole. If that is the
yardstick for Article 22 measures, then they are inadequate because they do not make the
defendant liable for full restitution. The other possible purpose is to deter WTO violations.
Because they are limited to offsetting the “nullification or impairment,” Article 22 trade measures
will be inadequate to deter misbehavior. Thus, when governments regularly obey international
trade rules, fear of Article 22 sanctions is not a big explanatory factor. As Robert Hudec has
pointed out, “Ultimately, GATT law works because governments want it to work, not because
they are bullied into compliance by trade sanctions.”80
In summary, although the form of countermeasures remained substantially the same in the
GATT and the WTO, the purpose behind the measures changed. Wilcox’s prediction that
rebalancing measures would be perceived as sanctions is on the mark 50 years later. Ironically,
the WTO has now achieved a sanction-based dispute settlement system similar to the one
intended for the ILO in 1919, but never embraced because of its poor fit to the ILO’s mission. Part
II of this article will consider the question of whether trade sanctions are a good fit for the WTO’s
mission.
The most remarkable feature of the transformation from GATT retaliation to WTO sanction
is that at no point did governments make an explicit choice to move from one principle to the
other. It just happened through the application of WTO law. Although some governments and
commentators may deny that any change has occurred, the evidence seems compelling that it has.
We should draw conclusions from that evidence. As Hans J. Morgenthau once explained, a
“science” of international law must be able to revise “the traditional pattern of assumptions,
concepts and devices” by looking at “the rules of international law as they are actually
applied.”81

13

II. Assessing WTO Trade
Part II provides a preliminary assessment of the use of trade sanctions in the WTO. Section
A considers the advantages of trade sanctions. Section B considers the disadvantages. Section C
summarizes. In this article, no attempt is made to quantify any of these points so that they can be
objectively weighed against each other.

A. Advantages of WTO Sanctions

This section will list seven distinct advantages in making trade sanctions available to the
plaintiff government when a defendant government fails to comply with a DSB recommendation.
Advantages 1-3 and 7 are to the parties to the dispute. Advantages 4-7 are to the WTO
membership as a whole. Note that Advantages 1-5 occur regardless of whether the trade action is
perceived as rebalancing or as a sanction.

1. Venting and Closure for Plaintiff. Perhaps the most important purpose served by
trade sanctions is that the plaintiff government can signal its outrage, placate the injured domestic
constituency, and close the chapter so that it can move on.82 In the Bananas and Hormones
retaliations, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) made clear to the European and American
publics that it was taking strong action against the noncompliance. The USTR action gave the
domestic industry some vindication. And the retaliation defused the issues to some extent.
The problem with this advantage is that the closed chapter is not staying closed. The EC
gave no thought to counter-retaliation and so to that extent, the U.S. action could be the final
step. But DSU Article 22.1 states that suspension is “temporary,” and therefore the question of
EC compliance will always be an issue for USTR. Moreover, as the enactment of the carousel
shows, the affected domestic interests are not satisfied with the current level of retaliation.83 So
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while venting and closure could be an advantage, the evidence suggests that it may only be a
temporary one.

2. Gaiatsu for Defendant. Being retaliated against can also be useful for the defendant
government by giving it leverage at home to change the law. The phenomenon of foreign
pressure to promote internal change is often called “gaiatsu,” the Japanese term for it. This
hypothesis assumes that the government wants to comply with WTO rules but cannot because of
domestic politics. The threat of sanctions changes the domestic political balance, however, by
catalyzing the forces who would be hurt by the retaliation.
This would be a clever technique if it worked. It has not worked so far in Bananas or
Hormones.84 Yet one can see evidence for it in a few cases such as U.S. Gasoline, Australia
Salmon, and Canada Periodicals, where the defendant governments were able to reverse
discriminatory policies that had been promoted by special interests.

3. Usability of Sanctions. Probably the clearest advantage of a trade sanction is that it
can be implemented by the plaintiff country once the DSB approves it. Unlike compensation
which requires a bilateral agreement, the trade sanction is self-implementing in the sense that the
plaintiff government can act alone. This may seem an obvious point, but it is a big advantage over
alternative instruments.

4. De Facto Political Safeguard for Defendant. A refusal to comply with a panel report
and a consequent willingness to accept sanctions can be viewed as a safeguard. The trading
system has always recognized in GATT Article XIX the need for a safety valve to let governments
protect seriously injured sectors. (When that occurs, an affected country can respond with a
discriminatory trade measure unless it has been adequately compensated.) But such safeguards
are only available de jure for protectionist purposes. Perhaps DSU Article 22 trade sanctions
make available a de facto political safeguard.
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Because of its state-centric orientation, the WTO pays no attention to democratic processes
in member countries.85 Each government is obliged to comply with WTO rules, but no thought is
given to whether its Congress or Parliament will approve such action. Thus, a dispute panel can
recommend action to a defendant government that its lawmakers simply will not approve. Indeed,
a panel can dictate action that would be a Constitutional violation for a government to perform.86
Given this potential disconnect between WTO obligations and the political ability of
democratic governments to comply with them, perhaps there should be space in the WTO for
“political safeguards” in instances where disputed measures are backed by strong public support.
Hormones could be an example of this.87 No one denies that the European Commission would
have a difficult political chore in repealing that measure. But right now, the EC has no WTO-legal
way to refuse meat produced with artificial hormones. Complying with DSB recommendations
remains an obligation, even after being sanctioned.88

5. WTO Supervises Unilateralism. In its role of authorizing sanctions, the WTO becomes
the gatekeeper. The DSU requires that sanctions be approved (even if pro forma) by the DSB and
provides an opportunity for the defendant government to seek arbitration of the amount of
sanctions.89 In all five instances in which Article 22 arbitrators have reviewed suspension
requests, the panel cut back the retaliation proposed by the plaintiff government.90 Because it is
better that retaliatory actions be authorized than executed unilaterally, the supervision of
sanctions in the DSU is a big advantage.91
Although the U.S. Section 301 retaliation law was roundly criticized by many trade experts
in the 1980s, Hudec took the more nuanced position that Section 301 was justified disobedience
given the dysfunctions in GATT dispute settlement.92 Hudec suggested that Section 301 could
lead to systemic reforms, and indeed it did. The taming of USTR’s aggressive unilateralism can be
viewed as a positive development even if similar retaliation ensues. USTR had already retaliated
against the EC on hormones in 1989, which USTR withdrew in 1996 at the outset of the WTO
litigation. So in assessing the WTO Hormones retaliation, one should recall that baseline.
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Another way of expressing this advantage is that the DSU meets the specifications of
Section 301 which, one way or the other, will be carried out by the hegemonic United States. If
the DSU were rewritten to eliminate the possibility of trade sanctions, then international trade law
would no longer be consistent with U.S. domestic law, and so the United States would act outside
WTO rules.

6. Sanctions Improve WTO Stature. Giving the WTO sanctioning authority improves its
stature among international organizations and engenders respect for it. Had the teeth not been
implanted, few would call the WTO the “powerful WTO” as it is routinely referred to today.
Furthermore, the availability of trade sanctions may be a key explanation for the high number of
complaints that are being brought to the DSB. Several of the causes of action spring from
longtime violations of GATT rules which did not change in the Uruguay Round.
The corollary to this point is that if somehow the trade sanctions were surgically extracted
from the DSU, the WTO would lose stature. This suggests that if sanctions are to be eliminated,
they must first be replaced with an alternative that maintains respect for the WTO. Some options
for doing so will be discussed in Part III.

7. Sanctions Promote Compliance. In listing this Advantage last, I try to point out that
inducing compliance is not the sole basis for judging the success of WTO sanctions. As noted
earlier, in the two cases so far where sanctions were employed, no compliance ensued. But that is
too limited an evaluation.
A broader test is whether the threat of WTO sanctions promotes compliance so that the
sanctions do not have to be imposed. In a few WTO cases, the threat of impending sanctions
seems to have brought scofflaw governments into line. Such negative reinforcement occurred in
the Australia Salmon and Leather disputes, where Australia took much of the action demanded by
Canada and the United States.93 The U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation case is another example.94
The U.S. Congress passed a “clean” tax bill via a suspension of the rules in the House, unanimous
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consent in the Senate, and another suspension in the House. The final action occurred just a few
days before the date that the EC had threatened to lodge its Article 22 request with the DSB.
Congress watchers agree that this unprecedented, streamline procedure for a tax bill would never
have occurred without impending retaliation.
The mechanism by which the threat of sanctions induces compliance is not solely state-tostate. Rather, the sanctioning government (or sender) threatens private actors in the target
country who then lobby their government to comply with the WTO recommendation.95 As
Hudec explains, “Hopefully, the economic pain caused by the retaliation, threatened or actual, will
enlist the support of the affected economic interests.”96 Political scientists will recognize this as a
three-level game, as the sanctioning government interacts with domestic private actors, a foreign
government, and foreign private actors.97

B. Disadvantages of WTO Sanctions

This section lists nine distinct disadvantages of WTO-authorized trade sanctions.
Disadvantages 1-3 are to the parties to the dispute. Disadvantages 1 and 4-9 are to the WTO
membership. Note that Disadvantages 2-6 and 8 occur regardless of whether the trade action is
perceived as rebalancing or a sanction.

1. Sanctions Don’t Work. As noted above, sanctions failed in the two instances when
they were used. But both cases are against an intractable target (the EC), and both cases involve
difficult, non-trade issuesoverseas development in Bananas and health (or culture) in
Hormones. So those cases may be exceptional.
If sanctions do not work, the common response will be to change WTO rules to give them
more bite. Instead of a 1:1 relationship between retaliation and “nullification or impairment,” one
could imagine a punitive sanction with a higher ratio. The U.S. Congressional carousel is one step
toward making sanctions more costly.98 The new legislation would rotate the carousel every six
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months. Another proposal is to multilateralize the sanction by allowing all WTO governments to
impose Article 22 measures. In 1992, Kenneth Abbott recommended that the GATT consider a
multilateral suspension of concessions, which he called a “true community sanction.”99 The idea
of collective retaliation in the GATT goes back to 1965 when developing countries sought this
remedy for violations by large countries. The industrial countries did not agree to this parity of
pain, as Hudec explains, because they were comfortable with a legal system “where they can hurt
the others but some of the others cannot really hurt them.”100

2. No Relief to Injured Private Economic Actors. In his study of GATT “retaliation,”
Dam notes that “the protection afforded the [complaining] domestic industry is fortuitous,
because the tariff category on which retaliation occurs is unlikely to be related to any need of that
industry for protection.”101 It would be possible, of course, for policymakers to select tariff
categories to satisfy an industry’s demand for protection rather than leaving it to chance. Yet
that would lead to a separate disadvantage (see #6 below).
This author is not aware of any study showing how much import relief was provided to
livestock hormone users in the United States and Canada as a result of the Hormones retaliation.
It would be a good research topic for an economist. A large portion of the products included in
each government’s retaliation list were animal products, but it is unclear to what extent they
match the companies that wanted to export hormone-grown meat to the EC.102
The DSB has no requirement that the sanctioning government provide help to the
complaining private economic actors. Indeed, the DSU completely ignores the complaining
industry. One could imagine a requirement that any import duties collected in trade sanctions be
paid to the complaining industry, but the DSU does not do that. In June 2000, Senator Max
Baucus introduced a bill to establish a Beef Industry Compensation Trust Fund that would
channel the tariffs collected from U.S. retaliation in the Hormones dispute into “relief” for the U.S.
beef industry.103 The bill was not enacted in 2000.
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3. The Teeth Bite Back. Perhaps the biggest disadvantage of WTO sanctions is that they
bite the country imposing the sanction. In the Bananas and Hormones cases, USTR imposed high
tariffs on EC exports, which frustrates domestic users who suffer a loss of choice and probably
have to pay higher prices for substitute products. Of course, many of these costs are simply
transfers from domestic consumers to producers. But the sender country does entail some overall
efficiency losses, and could end up getting hurt as much as the target country.
This inherent problem with trade retaliation has long been noted. Perhaps the earliest
analyst was Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations who analyzed the utility of “retaliation” to
open foreign markets.104 Smith wrote that unilateral retaliation may be a good policy if it works to
secure repeal of foreign barriers. But when “there is no probability that any such repeal can be
procured, it seems a bad method of compensating the injury done to certain classes of our people,
to do another injury ourselves, not only to those classes, but to almost all the other classes of
them.”105 In his landmark tariff study of 1921, T.E.G. Gregory explained that a retaliatory trade
war causes losses among both parties.106
Commentators continue to point out the self-punishing nature of trade retaliation.107 For
example, in his discussion of GATT Article XXIII, Dam notes that “it often becomes painfully
obvious that no one gains by retaliation ….”108 Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis rue that
“A basic problem with [WTO] retaliation is that it involves raising barriers to trade, which is
generally detrimental to the interests of the country that does so ….”109
This author is not aware of any study of the full domestic impact of the retaliatory tariffs
imposed in Hormones and Bananas.110 Such a study would have to look at the cost of securing
replacements to the sanctioned products in the United States and at whether U.S. meat exports
were successfully redirected to other countries. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce,
the U.S. Government’s retaliation committee “makes every effort to minimize the harmful effects
on U.S. businesses and consumers.”111 That contention should be evaluated.112
The suggestion that WTO sanctions are badly targeted is based on the assumption that the
sanctions are intended to hurt foreigners, not domestic denizens. But there is another theory of

20

sanctions which suggests that the way to induce others to act is not to punish them, but rather to
punish oneself. The hunger strike is one well-known manifestation of that view. This theory may
have originated in ancient Ireland where the aggrieved party sometimes inflicted punishment on
himself as a way of inducing the perpetrator to make amends for his misdeeds.113 So if USTR
intended the Bananas and Hormones sanctions to hurt Americans, Disadvantage 3 would not
apply.

4. Sanctions Undermine the WTO and Free Trade. In approving trade sanctions for
commercial reasons, the WTO undermines its own principles favoring open trade. To be sure, this
is not a complete repudiation since the WTO retains much of the mercantilist flavor of the GATT.
Yet in endorsing the use of trade sanctions, the WTO seems to suggest that the sanctioning
government can improve its prosperity by imposing sanctions.
Therefore, sanctions lead to a conundrum: If the United States improved its welfare after
USTR imposed the 100 percent tariffs in the Bananas and Hormones cases, then why wait for the
WTO to authorize such actions? On the other hand, if the welfare benefits of sanctions are
dubious, then why engage in sanctions? At the very least, the use of sanctions confuses the
public as to the costs and benefits of tariffs.
International agencies do not generally plan to take actions that contradict the agency’s
purpose.114 For example, the World Health Organization does not authorize one party to spread
viruses to another. The World Intellectual Property Organization does not fight piracy with
piracy. So the WTO’s use of trade restrictions to promote freer trade is bizarre.
Many groups and commentators have pointed to the contradiction of having the WTO
authorize trade sanctions. For example, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
worries that the trading system “is threatened by trade sanctions because well-connected
multinationals have pushed governments into a battle for market share in consuming
countries.”115 Gary Horlick says: “Simply stated, the purpose of the WTO is not to impose 100
percent duties on importers of Roquefort cheese, or other innocent bystanders.”116 (Roquefort
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cheese is on the U.S. retaliation list in the Hormones dispute.) Joost Pauwelyn has noted the irony
that the world body preaching the liberalization of trade depicts countermeasures as offering
some kind of favor that should neutralize the effect of illegal trade restrictions imposed by
others. 117

5. Sanctions Trample Human Rights. Legitimization of trade sanctions by the WTO
tramples human rights in both importing and exporting countries. The freedom to engage in
voluntary commercial intercourse is a basic human right.118 At every point in its compliance
process, the WTO fails to consider how sanctions hurt innocent victims on both ends of a
disrupted transaction. In August 2000, European victims of U.S. retaliation in the Bananas
dispute sued the European Union for damages.119 The lawsuit will probably not succeed, but it
shows the public who is being hurt.
In making this point, I am not suggesting that the individual’s right to trade is currently
engrained in international human rights law. Unfortunately, that fundamental right is missing from
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. So the WTO law on sanctions is not inconsistent with current human rights
law.
Nevertheless, the WTO is out of step with the emerging idea that the State’s right to
engage in trade gains content only from the individuals encompassed in it. Consider, for example,
the judgment of the WTO Section 301 panel which declared:
Trade is conducted most often and increasingly by private operators. It is through improved
conditions for these private operators that Members benefit from WTO disciplines. The
denial of benefits to a Member which flows from a breach is often indirect and results from
the impact of the breach on the market place and the activities of individuals within it.120

The panel considered such individuals in interpreting DSU rules. Recently, Pierre Lemieux has
critiqued the WTO’s action in the Brazil Aircraft case from the individual rights perspective. He
writes that “… trade retaliation makes no economic sense and it is not morally defensible. Instead,
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we should find ways to prevent governments from forbidding their own citizens to trade
freely.”121
Finally, one telling anecdote: At the anti-WTO demonstrations in Seattle in late 1999, as
chronicled in the film documentary “Trade Off,” some protestors showed their defiance of the
WTO by eating Roquefort cheese which had been smuggled into the United States from France.

6. Sanctions Encourage Protectionism. As noted above (B2), a tension exists between
providing recompense to domestic exporters hurt by foreign trade barriers and helping those same
companies avoid import competition. The DSU bows a little toward protection by providing that
retaliation be considered first in the same sector as the dispute.122 Yet shielding the domestic
market from foreign competition is unlikely to undo the damage caused by closed foreign markets.
In May 2000, the U.S. Congress instituted the so-called carousel provision which requires
USTR to rotate the retaliation targets every six months.123 In addition, the new law requires USTR
to include “reciprocal goods of the industries affected” on the original and subsequent retaliation
lists.124 So far, USTR has refused to turn this carousel. If USTR does so, that may make future U.S.
sanctions more protectionist.
In some instances, retaliation will occur on products chosen by a government at the behest
of lobbyists who recognize sanctions as an opportunity to secure import protection. This seems to
have occurred with pork in the U.S. Hormones dispute.125 Although the Clinton Administration
was expected to announce new carousel sanctions in mid-June 2000, the decision was postponed
to give USTR more time to evaluate over 400 suggestions from the private sector.126 As it
observes this process of special interest lobbying, the American public is unlikely to gain greater
enthusiasm for U.S. trade policy. Indeed, the dangers of retaliation were noted by the Meltzer
Commission which said that
Retaliation is contrary to the spirit of the WTO. Sanctions increase restrictions on trade and
create or expand groups interested in maintaining the restrictions. Domestic bargaining over
who will benefit from protection weakens support for open trading arrangements.127
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The availability of trade sanctions may have other predictable, negative effects. For
example, industries may look for WTO violations by foreign countries (not too hard to find) and
encourage a government to file cases against deep-seated foreign laws for the express purpose of
using retaliation to secure new protection. Another problem is that once sanctions are turned on,
vested interests collecting rents may fight hard against removing sanctions even after the
defendant government takes action to comply.

7. Sanctions Encourage Discrimination. An economic sanction is perforce
discriminatory against the country being sanctioned. But it is one thing to sanction a scofflaw
country in a blunt way, and another to single out particular companies or subnational
governments. It is unclear whether the current U.S. retaliation is targeting companies. USTR is
targeting specific EC countries, however, with the intent of influencing internal Community
decisionmaking. 128 In Hormones, USTR varied the countries for several items on the hit list; none
of the sanctions is EC-wide.129 This sort of discrimination contradicts the most-favored-nation
principle. But the DSU does not demand that sanction targets be selected in the least-GATTinconsistent manner.130

8. Unequal Opportunities. The sanctioning power tends to favor larger economies over
smaller ones.131 This is a disadvantage for the small countries and the WTO system. To the extent
that small countries are more trade-dependent than large countries, sanctions will hurt the small
country more. As a victorious plaintiff, a smaller country would not be able to inflict much harm
upon a larger country.

9. WTO Sets Bad Example. For a trade organization to employ trade sanctions sets a bad
example for other international organizations. The WTO example is not followed literally; as
noted above, no other organization would contravene its own norms the way that the WTO does.
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But other organizations might want to utilize trade sanctions as an instrument for enforcing
obligations.
If the WTO employs trade sanctions in dispute settlement, there is no principled reason why
other international agencies should not do so too.132 The unprincipled reason for having trade
sanctions in the WTO, but not elsewhere, is that the WTO decides when trade sanctions can be
used. From this perspective, WTO rules are constitutional in superintending the instruments that
other treaties can use to achieve compliance.
This constitutional view of the WTO is objectionable for at least two reasons. First, the
WTO is more of a club than an organization of global governance due to its difficult accession
process. How could such a club purport to set parameters for U.N. treaties? Second, many world
causes, like eliminating forced labor, would seem to provide better justifications for trade sanctions
than maintaining commercial reciprocity.
Although some proposals have been made for legislating WTO-like trade sanctions in other
regimes in order to strengthen compliance, most commentators have suggested the
oppositebringing the rules of other regimes into the WTO for enforcement. 133 That is what
happened with intellectual property in the Uruguay Round, and many civil society organizations
have urged the same tack with environment and labor.134 Such initiatives have resulted in a
political challenge for the trading system, and were one factor in the failure at Seattle to launch a
new WTO round. 135
Since the advent of the WTO, commentators have increasingly portrayed trade sanctions as
a prerequisite for an enforceable treaty arrangement. So long as the WTO retains trade sanctions,
they will be an allure to activists who want to use similar enforcement in other conventional
international law.136 These activists are not going to be swayed by the argument that trade
sanctions can only be employed by the one organization where their use is self-contradictory.

C. Summary
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A method for weighing the advantages and disadvantages against each other is not
obvious. Some of the advantages and disadvantages are in direct tension -- for example,
Advantage 6 versus Disadvantages 4 and 9. Advantage 7 and Disadvantage 1 are also in tension.
In my view, the disadvantages of WTO trade sanctions outweigh the advantages.
Disadvantages 3-4, 6, and 9 are most salient. On the other side, Advantages 1, 3, and 5, have
considerable merit. Moreover, the threat of sanctions does seem to promote compliance, although
this effect could diminish if WTO sanctions came into regular use.
Five years from now, with more episodes to study, the overall picture may become clearer.
By then, we may learn whether sanctions are inducing compliance and whether the sanction
procedure makes it harder to attain new WTO trade agreements. Even if trade sanctions are
shown to be counterproductive, however, they will likely remain WTO policy until they can be
replaced. 137

III. Alternatives to WTO Trade Sanctions
The WTO needs a rule-based dispute resolution system. This is particularly useful for
smaller countries who are disadvantaged in a system where disputes can only be resolved through
bargaining and settlement. Furthermore, any dispute system needs a compliance review process.
The concern I am raising in this article is not about those features. It is only about the use of trade
sanctions as a “last resort.”138
Part III of this article explores alternatives to trade sanctions. Section A looks at fines and
other sanctions not involving trade restrictions. Section B considers enforcement of international
public law judgments in domestic courts. Section C looks at the option of trade compensation.
Section D explores softer compliance approaches relying on transparency and oversight.

A. Models for Sanctions Other Than Trade
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Excluding military measures, the U.N. Charter provides for “interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations.”139 But the U.N. Security Council generally has not attempted
to isolate outlaw countries by using more than trade sanctions.140 Outside the United Nations, a
few types of non-trade sanctions have been legislated or actually used, as noted below:

1. Monetary Fine. In 1993, the side agreements to the North American Free Trade
Agreement provided the possibility of fines as a remedy in dispute settlement. The North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation calls for dispute settlement on the question
of whether a government is effectively enforcing its domestic law.141 If inadequate enforcement is
found by a panel and the defendant government does not fully implement the agreed-upon action
plan, the panel has the obligation of imposing a “monetary enforcement assessment” on the
defendant government.142 The panel would set the size of the assessment.143 The assessment
would then be paid to a tri-national fund to be used to improve enforcement in the defendant
country. These pecuniary provisions have seen no use since the Agreement went into force in
1994.

2. Loss of Vote. The (Chicago) Convention on International Civil Aviation provides for
dispute resolution by the ICAO Council established by the Convention.144 An appeal is provided,
and then the ensuing decision is final.145 Any government found in default will have its voting
power suspended in ICAO.146

3. Ineligibility for Technical Assistance. Governments violating a treaty can risk losing
technical assistance. In 1999, the ILO Conference barred Myanmar from receiving any further
technical assistance from the ILO until Myanmar takes action to come into compliance with the
ILO Forced Labour Convention.147 Another example of this type of sanction is in the Montreal
Protocol for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The Protocol has a process to judge non-
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compliance that can lead to a suspension of “rights and privileges,” such as benefits from the
financial mechanism.148 As of 2000, several countries have been reviewed, but no privileges have
yet been suspended.149

4. Flouting Intellectual Property Rights. In the WTO Bananas case, Ecuador asked for
and received permission from the DSB to suspend obligations under the WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 150 The WTO arbitrators noted that
the suspension of obligations under the TRIPS Agreement interferes with private rights owned by
natural or legal persons.151 Nevertheless, the arbitrators pointed out that it was not within their
mandate to consider whether they were giving Ecuador the go-ahead to violate intellectual
property treaties.152 Recently, Arvind Subramanian and Jayashree Watal advocated using TRIPS
as a “retaliatory weapon.”153 The main difficulty these analysts see is that national laws
protecting intellectual property may not be flexible enough to be suspended in a discriminatory
way.154

Assessment. Of these alternatives, the imposition of monetary fines would be the most
useful. A key advantage of a fine is that it properly targets the pain to the scofflaw country. The
main disadvantage is that there is no way to compel payment. In 1915, F.N. Keen proposed that
States deposit a sum of money proportioned on population or financial resources that would be
available to answer international obligations.155 This did not happen, but is still a good idea.
Having the WTO disqualify a country from voting is not a good idea because the WTO at
present does not conduct any voting. Yet withdrawing other membership rights may have
possibilities. One key right that could be withdrawn from a scofflaw country is its right to invoke
WTO dispute settlement.156 This could perhaps be done under current DSU rules because the
DSU is a “covered agreement” for purposes of authorizing retaliation.157 Another option would
be to disqualify any party in non-compliance from recommending any of its delegates to serve as
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chairperson of a WTO subsidiary organ. An advantage of such shaming sanctions is that they can
be crafted to be irritating to the scofflaw party.158
Having the WTO withdraw technical assistance is not a useful idea. The WTO does not
deliver much technical assistance at present, and needs to do more. Moreover, in the two cases so
far in which sanctions are being used, the scofflaw defendants are EC nations which do not need
WTO technical assistance. Indeed, they are often the donor countries for WTO assistance
programs.
In approving trade sanctions against intellectual property owners, the WTO negates its role
as a champion of intellectual property “rights.” Many critics have lamented the way that the
WTO pirated the intellectual property treaties of the World Intellectual Property Organization
back in 1994. But having done so, WTO should not undermine those treaties by ungluing their
obligations.

B. Direct Effect of WTO Decisions

Although the WTO Agreement states that “Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its
laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements,” the WTO does not require governments to provide recourse to domestic courts so
as to enforce WTO obligations. 159 At present, it appears that no WTO member government
provides for such direct enforcement in its own courts. Indeed, in recent litigation, courts have
suggested that there would be a disadvantage to a country having such enforcement when its
trade partners do not.160
Enforcing treaties or tribunal decisions in domestic courts is sometimes called giving them
“direct effect.”161 How direct effect would work in a WTO context is unclear. In any WTO
dispute, there could be numerous plausible ways to come into compliance with WTO rules. Thus,
bringing a government into compliance with WTO rules is generally thought to be a legislative or
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administrative function rather than a judicial one. If a domestic court were to void the WTOinconsistent provision, it would have to decide whether the rest of the law is severable.
Two recent regional trade agreements have provided for direct effect of panel decisions,
but none of these provisions has been tested. The North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation exempts Canada from trade sanctions and instead provides that the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation may file a dispute panel report in Canadian courts which then
becomes an “order” of the court, following which the Commission may lodge proceedings to
enforce this order.162 The Canada-Chile Environmental Cooperation Agreement is modeled on
the North American Agreement, and provides for filing a panel report in the courts of either Chile
or Canada.163
Rather than direct effect in the judicial branch, governments can adopt special legislative or
administrative procedures to facilitate compliance with adverse panel decisions. For example, U.S.
law restricts the exports of unprocessed timber from certain lands but authorizes the President to
suspend this restriction if the WTO rules against it.164 Another example is the U.S. Uruguay
Round Agreements Act which provides special procedures for implementing WTO
recommendations finding fault with determinations by the U.S. International Trade Commission or
the Department of Commerce.165

C. Trade Compensation

The DSU expresses a preference for compensation over suspension of concessions, but
notes that compensation is voluntary.166 Compensation in this context means action by the
defendant government to reduce trade barriers. It does not refer to financial compensation
(although that outcome is not precluded).167 Compensation in the WTO would have to be given
consistently with the most-favored-nation rule.168
Thus, one “problem” with compensation is that in lowering tariffs to the plaintiff country,
the defendant will also provide greater market access to third parties, and the sum total will likely
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be higher than the “nullification or impairment” to the plaintiff. Quotas are more usable for
limiting compensation, but the WTO should not encourage more quotas.
Many trade law analysts favor compensation. Pauwelyn proposes that the DSU be
changed to make compensation compulsory.169 Horlick has improved the proposal by suggesting
that the winning plaintiff be allowed to choose the products for compensation.170 But no one has
devised a solution for making the defendant comply. It takes two to compensate. As noted
above, one of the virtues of WTO sanctions is that they can be implemented unilaterally.

D. Softer Compliance Approaches

In their study of compliance with international regulatory instruments, Abram and Antonia
Handler Chayes conclude that “Coercive sanctions are more infeasible for everyday treaty
enforcement than as a response to crisis. Treaties with teeth are a will-o’-the-wisp.”171 Rather
than sanctions, compliance is promoted through regime processes that utilize reporting,
monitoring, capacity building, and persuasion. The authors also point to the potential usefulness
of participation by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the compliance process.172
It is noteworthy that the one early international organization, the ILO, that had recourse to
trade sanctions in its Constitution made no use of them. Coercive sanctions were viewed as
contradicting the basic norm of the Organization, which is that raising labor standards is in every
country’s own interest.173 Instead, the ILO sought to induce domestic implementation of ILO
conventions through independent review procedures and social dialogue.174
The insight that compliance is promoted through softer approaches has been reached by
analysts looking at many different regimes including, most notably, human rights and
environment.175 Rather than coercing governments, international treaty systems work by pulling
governments into compliance through review processes and technical assistance. Behavior can
be changed more easily by the power of persuasion than by the persuasion of power. As Richard
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N. Cooper advises: “If we want others to give the same weight to diverse human values as we do,
we must persuade them, not coerce them, to shift the relative weights they choose.”176
Even without sanctions, the WTO would have better dispute settlement than most other
treaties. Compare it to the multilateral environmental regime which generally lacks independent
dispute settlement.177 For example, the International Whaling Commission has no way to
investigate whether Japan’s recent expansion of “scientific” whaling is legitimate or just junk
science. 178 The new International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an important development in
favor of judicialization.
The DSU rules are sophisticated and engage the defendant government in a compliance
process. The DSB retains jurisdiction until the issue is resolved, and after six months, the issue of
implementation goes on the agenda for each DSB meeting.179 In addition, the defendant
government must provide a written status report before each meeting. Unfortunately, the DSB
meetings are not open to the public so many of the potential benefits of this surveillance are lost.
It is possible that greater transparency of the WTO’s factfinding and judgments might
catalyze public opinion in the countries under review. At present, the typical WTO panel report is
dry, abstruse, and lengthy, as perhaps befits an international law judgment. But one could
imagine each panel preparing a digestible version for the public. For example in Hormones, the
panel could have given Eurocitizens a clear explanation for why the hormone ban failed to meet
international rules.

IV. Recommendations and Conclusion
The DSU affirms that “full implementation of a [DSB] recommendation to bring a measure
into conformity with the covered agreements” is preferred over compensation or suspension of
concessions.180 But the DSU does not do enough to secure such implementation. International
norms will be adhered to when they get domesticated into national law.
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New modalities are needed to promote compliance in national decisionmaking processes
when legislative changes are required. One possibility would be to establish a DSU Optional
Protocol whereby a WTO member government could sign on to the following procedure:

1. In any WTO dispute settlement, panels would be requested to use their authority to
“suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations.”181
2. Governments would establish a Domestic Body to consider the panel report and to draft
legislation to meet WTO obligations. The Body would not have to follow the panel’s suggestion
as to implementation, but would be obligated to recommend, within six months, new legislation to
correct the WTO-inconsistent features of current law. This Body would give interested foreign
and domestic private economic actors an opportunity to provide public comments. The rules of
the Body would need to preclude consideration of whether the DSB decision was correct.182
3. Governments would enact a fast-track procedure to provide for a legislative vote on the
recommendation of the Body within four months.183 The national Parliament or Congress would
be free to reject the recommendation, and if that occurs, the issue would be returned to the WTO
for Article 22 sanction procedures. Of course, the defendant government could always use its
normal legislative procedures to achieve compliance.184
4. The process would begin immediately after the DSB adoption of the panel report. The
full Optional Protocol time period would be deemed the “reasonable period of time” for DSU
purposes.185

While this Optional Protocol certainly does not assure a WTO-consistent outcome, it has
the potential of making it easier for a defendant country to comply. The Optional Protocol seeks
to influence the defendant government’s decisionmaking from within, rather than to change it
only from without by external economic pressure. In establishing a Domestic Body, a government
makes an institution responsible for transforming a DSU decision into proposed legislative
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language. By receiving specific suggestions from the WTO panel, the Domestic Body will start
with an option on the table. By giving private economic actors (e.g., consumer NGOs) the right to
make statements, the body will seek to enhance public discourse about the dispute. By providing
fast-track consideration, endless delays are headed off. By underlining the fundamental role of
the national legislature, the Protocol avoids the politically treacherous approach of domestic
judicial enforcement of WTO decisions.
It is true that the Optional Protocol might delay the authorization of sanctions by a few
months. But if the Protocol works, it will render sanctions unnecessary. That trade-off should be
worth it. To be sure, some governments might frustrate the object of this Protocol by composing
the Domestic Body with individuals who will resist serious efforts at compliance. Nevertheless, a
well-intentioned government that wants to comply, yet faces objections from strong domestic
interests, might find the Optional Protocol useful. A group of such governments might join
together to put the Protocol into force.
Professor Hudec has taught us that “The process of creating any legal system, where none
existed before, can only come about slowly and incrementally. The ideas and institutions that
make a legal system ‘effective’ have to grind themselves into the political attitudes of the
societyhere, the society of governmentsover time.”186 By contrasting WTO-sponsored
sanctions with softer compliance measures, this article shows the need to grind new attitudes into
the WTO. Similarly, in recommending a new domestic procedure that would be interpenetrated by
a WTO panel report, this article offers a proposal for reinforcing attitudes within countries toward
achieving compliance. If sound replacements to trade sanctions can be found, the WTO will
improve itself by pulling out its teeth.
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